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INTRODUCTION
Exhausted American soldiers lined the Naktong River in a series of observation posts to provide early warning and to direct and adjust artillery fire missions to disrupt the next enemy attack. Mindful of every errant noise, no one could be sure where or when the North Koreans would attempt another attack to dismantle the fragile Pusan perimeter, the final effort to buy time to allow the United Nations to build-up forces in Korea. The hot summer months and lack of rain had decreased the depth the river to a mere three feet in several areas, almost negating the river as a defensive obstacle for United Nations forces. The Naktong River defenders were aware of these conditions and anticipated a large-scale North Korean attack, nervously aware of the calm before the storm. As expected, incoming artillery rained in on the men and broke the silence, a standard precursor to a North Korean attack. Amidst the cloud of shrapnel, the defenders hurried to reinforce their positions with all available forces. According to plan, fire support officers executed designated artillery and air targets on likely enemy crossing points to increase their responsiveness. However, the plan did not account for every aspect of the enemy's attack.
Forward observers, observation battalions and observation aircraft were all refining targets and adjusting calls for fire to compensate for this lack of predictability. Requests for indirect artillery support funneled into the fire support net monitored by the corps artillery headquarters. They maintained centralized control of all artillery units not under the control of the division to permit maximum integration of all available assets on the targets. Meanwhile, the artillerymen were hard at work slamming rounds into their howitzers and guns in an attempt to keep up with enemy offensive. The harsh Korean terrain thwarted any attempt to reposition the howitzers in response to the enemy threat. Regardless, they delivered massive amounts of artillery at an alarming rate, sometimes exceeding the howitzer's physical capacity resulting in damage to the tubes. North
Korean soldiers struggled to maintain their formations and crossing sites, immediately noting the accuracy and effectiveness of the United Nation's volleys. Additionally, the North Koreans found their own artillery under intense bombardment, which limited their ability to continue to the attack. As the North Koreans began to disperse and retreat from the Naktong, they presented the United Nation's artillery forward observers with additional targets of opportunity. Divisional artillery battalions and close air support attempted to finish the rest of the enemy forces.
Unfortunately, just as the artillerymen were about to deliver another destructive volley, their position was attacked by an infiltration force that had slipped through the line. Transitioning to direct lay mode, the artillerymen attempted to depress the tubes to engage dismounted enemy breaching the defensive wire. As enemy armor, artillery and machine gun fire increased, the artillerymen abandoned their howitzers to take up defensive positions in nearby buildings.
Ultimately, it was a lost cause. Forced to evacuate the firing point, the artillerymen left the howitzers to the North Koreans. United States artillery in the Korean War was a mix of towed and self-propelled howitzers and guns that delivered projectiles up to fifteen miles away upon designated targets.
2 The ability to employ these weapons at the most basic level hinged on the interaction of the three components 1 Bevin Alexander, Korea the First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1993) , [135] [136] [140] [141] [142] ; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing, 1961), 248, 282-283, 343. 2 U.S. artillery in the Korean War in 1953 consisted of 105-mm. howitzer, truck and selfpropelled; 155-mm. howitzer, tractor and self-propelled; 155-mm. gun, towed and self-propelled; 8-inch howitzer, tractor and self-propelled; and 240-mm. howitzer, tractor; Janice E. McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 2007 , 201; Historically, guns were usually fired with low flat trajectories and solid shot, whereas howitzers fired at higher trajectories with solid shot, grapeshot and canister; McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 of the artillery team: the observer that locates the target, the fire direction center that computes the data to engage the target, and the actual howitzer or gun team that executes the mission.
Massed fires were concentrating the effects of more than one howitzer or gun on a single target.
Artillery battalions of up to eighteen howitzers could coordinate these effects on a single target internally. However, on a larger scale, synchronizing multiple battalions in this way added another level of complexity. These massed effects did not simply happen in the Korean War; extensive target planning, adequate command and control structures to coordinate efforts and the flexibility to engage targets of opportunity with divisional and nondivisional artillery made them possible. Centralized control at the battalion and corps levels permitted the controlling authority to determine the most lucrative targets to engage with the full complement of artillery and close air support.
3 Additionally, the survivability of artillery battalions was critical to ensure the availability of all battalions at any time. Security of artillery forces was lacking in the beginning of the conflict. During the Pusan defense, North Korean forces overran the United Nation's artillery positions several times, but United Nations forces fought to regain lost ground with the infantry. By 1951, the artillery battalions corrected or mitigated the majority of the security concerns. 4 Despite the security shortfalls of the artillery in support of the Pusan perimeter, operational artillery remained highly effective at repelling the human wave attacks of North Korean forces.
5 3 Centralized control is the higher echelon's ability to direct artillery missions for all units assigned or attached to the headquarters for control. "Corps artillery, division artillery, and field artillery group commanders retain centralized control of their subordinate units whenever the tactical situation, distance between units, terrain, and communications make it possible." U.S. Department of the Army, Patterson, Grand Expectations, The United States, 1945 -1974 , https://read.amazon.com (accessed April 24, 2013 Millett, The War for Korea, 1950 Herring, From Korea, 1950 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 397-405; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 479-507; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, 644. 16 Operational artillery is the employment of nondivisional artillery assets to support the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose to achieve the operational or strategic objective. Korea, 1945 -1950 : A House Burning (2005 and
The War for Korea, 1950 : They Came From the North (2010 . Each of these books provided additional perspectives on the origins of the conflict, the impacts of combined arms and a more comprehensive Asian viewpoint. Contextually, James T. Patterson's book, Grand Expectations, The United States 1945 -1971 (1996 Defense, 2011), II-3. 22 Alexander, Korea, the First War We Lost, 122. The lessons from the Second World War validated the importance of artillery in modern conflict and presented a number of recommendations for improving its effects on the battlefield.
The structure of the force and doctrine after World War II centered on the concept of unlimited warfare using overwhelming firepower of nuclear weapons. 25 Artillery officers recommended increasing the number of artillery pieces in the organic division artillery formations, reestablishing the corps artillery headquarters as the command and control element for synchronizing fires, and pushing for more self-propelled artillery. 26 However, the drawdown of the U.S. Army, the lack of training associated with the drain of experienced leaders, and overreliance on atomic weapons during the period before the Korean War hampered the implementation of these lessons. 27 Additionally, equipment and ammunition shortages compounded the problem. American military forces became accustomed with trading firepower for maneuver, preferring to remain static in the defense. 28 In some cases, the U. sorties of close air support complemented these fires, all coordinated to maximize effects. 30 As thousands of Chinese troops flooded the X Corps' sector, a barrage of massed artillery fires and close air support stopped the offensive cold in its tracks.
During the Battle of the Soyang River, heavy concentrations of massed fires stopped a numerically superior enemy on the offensive. Commanders were no longer limited to imposed ammunition restrictions and could finally maximize the number of rounds that the artillery fired. 31 The combination of more rounds to fire and accurately concentrated artillery proved 29 A Chinese Army Group consisted of 3 divisions and approximately 30,000 soldiers. A North Korean Corps consisted of 3 to 4 understrength divisions and approximately 17,000 soldiers. 30 Millett, The War for Korea, 1950 Korea, -1951 codified the concept of mass as a recognized principle of war. It defined mass as "the concentration of superior forces, on the ground, at sea, and in the air, at the decisive place and time, and their employment in a decisive direction" to create the conditions essential to victory.
32
Applied to artillery, the concentration of effects from multiple artillery battalions as well as air support assets at the decisive place and time to provide an advantage over the enemy equaled massed fires. In order to concentrate and synchronize the effects of artillery and air support required detailed integrated fire planning, overlapping observation platforms and artillery mobility facilitated the defense. Behind the scenes of the United Nation's response was a honed artillery machine forged from their experiences from the past year's conflict and grounded in tested World War II doctrine.
There is a long history of synchronizing and concentrating artillery at the decisive place and time. Napoleon was notorious for his rapid maneuver and convergence of the mass of his army against a particular element of his foe, thus being stronger at the decisive point. 33 Clausewitz captured Napoleon's actions in his revered work On War, "There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated." 34 One would infer that in these descriptions "forces" could easily translate to firepower and thus the concentrated effects of artillery on the battlefield. Napoleon established massed fires as one of three roles for the artillery in combat. He would select a weak point along the enemy's line and commit the majority of his modified to compensate for the lack of available ammunition in theater. As more ammunition became available, United Nation's forces were able to increase these rates. Like the Civil War, World War I revalidated the effectiveness of artillery in defense and also strengthened the artillery role in the offense. 39 The advent of indirect fire, improved communication techniques and integration of fires advanced the artillery's ability to support maneuver. 40 The rolling artillery barrage became the preferred method of artillery employment in the offense. The barrage began at the enemy forward line and moved forward as the infantry 35 Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 362-363. 36 Ibid., 578-579. maneuver battalions nominated and refined targets synchronized with maneuver for execution while the unit artillery headquarters took these targets and determined the best way to support their execution through positioning of unit formations, type of missions required to achieve the desired effects and the logistical support plan. These plans occurred at all levels with the subordinate plans feeding the higher operational picture.
One of the essential elements of fire planning was prearranged fires, "planned fire which is to be delivered at a specified time or for which a need for rapid delivery can be anticipated and for which firing data are prepared in advance and kept current."
54 Essentially, these fires were pre-determined targets that were on call from the supported unit. 59 While these fires were more difficult to coordinate and less responsive, they provided the much needed flexibility to engage an ever-elusive target set.
Underpinning the execution of fire planning was the ability to acquire targets for both prearranged fires and targets of opportunity. The integration of forward observers at the tactical level and the observation battalions and observation aircraft at higher levels was essential to providing integrated targeting and accurate target locations for execution. Each of these elements played a unique role in synchronizing effective massed fire and providing accurate target data throughout the defenses in Korea. During the Korean conflict, forward observers were resident to the artillery formations with a section in the divisional artillery for each maneuver battalion.
60
Representing their maneuver elements, they refined and nominated targets for preplanned artillery fires and effectively integrated them into the defensive plans. These observers were skilled in calling fires for targets of opportunity as well as directing close air support. They served as a direct link between the maneuver battalions and the direct support artillery headquarters. Whereas the observers were the link with direct support artillery headquarters, the Observation Battalion was the link with nondivisional and Corps artillery headquarters. increased the number of observation batteries in the battalions from two to three as well as provided a counter-mortar radar platoon to each battery to better meet the requirements for wide front. 61 Observation battalions were responsible for six principle missions: Location of hostile artillery, registration and adjustment of friendly artillery, collection of information, conduct and coordination of corps artillery survey operations, comparative calibration of friendly artillery, and provision of ballistic meteorological data for friendly artillery and for sound ranging. 62 These roles were essential to three of the five requirements for accurate predictive fires: Accurate gun location, accurate target location and accurate meteorological data. Additionally, counter-battery fires through radar acquisition provided targets of opportunity at enemy artillery systems. 63 Unfortunately, the First Field Artillery Observation Battalion would be the only one available in theater until 1953. 64 This left the forward observers and observation aircraft to do most of the observation.
Observation aircraft were also vital to determining artillery targets of opportunity. The North Koreans were so effective at blending in with the terrain and camouflaging themselves that often the only way to find them was through slow moving observation aircraft. 65 This type of observation was not new to the Korean War, but improved radio communication between the aircraft and maneuver elements aided in the responsiveness and availability of aerial observation for all patrols. 66 Preplanned targeting and accurate target acquisition alone did not ensure massed artillery fires, ultimately artillery planners had to position the guns most effectively to support these functions.
The Korean topography was not ideal for quickly moving artillery units and supplies throughout the battlefield. The harsh landscape, inadequate improved roads, and extreme weather conditions restricted maneuver and limited logistical support. 67 The ability to quickly mass fires and protect the artillery laid in the flexibility of the artillery formations to meet the challenges posed by the terrain. Tactical mobility was the ability of the artillery formations to keep up with maneuver and traverse the terrain to maintain direct support artillery fires for maneuver.
68
Strategic mobility was the ability to quickly reposition artillery formations throughout the theater of operations to support the decisive operation, as well as providing the logistical train associated with drastically repositioning forces. 69 Strategic and tactical mobility in the Korean War required a mix of self-propelled and towed systems. Self-propelled artillery was a huge advantage for tactical mobility in the Korean War because of its ability to traverse rough terrain over the large University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 21.
fronts. 70 However, towed systems were lighter, easier to emplace and conceal, and were generally perceived as more strategically mobile. 71 The static nature of the defense in Korea coupled with the rugged terrain led to relying on the tactical mobility of the self-propelled systems that only existed in the nondivisional artillery formations. This allowed the corps the flexibility and mobility to quickly reinforce and augment divisional massed fires throughout the conflict. The mobility and range of self-propelled artillery made it possible to engage targets from greater distances and then quickly withdraw before coming into direct contact with the enemy.
72
Unfortunately, these systems were in short supply during the Korean War. 1950-1951 (1952) , 2-3. 74 Robertson, "The Korean War: The United Nations' Response to Heavy Bombardment,"109. they would make use of what they had. 75 Artillery leaders accomplished the effects of massed fires in Korea through preplanned and synchronized targeting at the divisional and nondivisional levels; the flexibility to mass fires on targets of opportunity through accurate target locating and mobility to position artillery forces to achieve those devastating effects.
UNITY OF COMMAND
Nondivisional artillery battalions were in high demand throughout the duration of the Korean conflict because of the need to reinforce existing divisional artillery battalions and provide flexibility for the corps. During the Korean War, Field Manual 100-5 defined unity of command as "that unity of effort which is essential to the decisive application of the full combat power of the available 75 Allan R Millett, The War for Korea, 1950 76 Ibid., [153] [154] forces." 78 Additionally, "unity of effort is furthered by full cooperation between the elements of command." 79 The first definition linked the ability to mass fires on the battlefield to the control of the artillery commander and the second with the ability of artillery and maneuver commanders to synchronize these effects. Artillery in Korea required an organizational command structure that allowed artillerymen to synchronize efforts and mass fires within their span of control while also meeting the needs of maneuver. To support the maneuver requirements, artillery commanders assigned specific roles or missions to the artillery units that explained the relationship of their support to the maneuver unit. 80 Another aspect of unity of command was the command relationships between artillery commanders and their supported unit commanders. 80 "Direct support artillery has the mission of supporting a specific unit of a command… Direct support artillery is not attached to the supported unit, it remains under the command of the higher artillery commander, but its fires are not taken away from the supported unit except by the authority of the division or force commander… General support artillery has the mission of supporting the force as a whole. Units with such a mission are held under the command of the artillery commander thus making immediately available to the force commander a reserve of fire with which to influence the action… A reinforcing mission requires the reinforcing artillery unit to augment the fires of the reinforced artillery unit on call." U.S. Department of the Army, 37. 81 "When the artillery is assigned or attached to the force (supported unit), the artillery officer is both a subordinate command and a special staff officer of the force (supported unit) commander. When artillery is neither assigned nor attached to the force but is supporting the force, the artillery commander's relationship to the force commander is both that of an advisor and that of an independent commander obliged to render continuous effective fire support in accordance with his assigned mission."; U. sustaining nondivisional artillery battalions. It designated artillery groups to controlled three to four of these self-sustaining artillery battalions and attached to group to the corps artillery headquarters. The group concept allowed the number of battalions directly supporting the corps to fluctuate, grow and contract as required. If necessary, the artillery battalions assigned to the group became a pool that the divisions used to draw additional support. Essentially, this decentralized the control of artillery battalions to the divisions with little retention at the corps level for a given mission. The flexibility of the group let the corps artillery headquarters consolidate artillery within the corps for a specific mission, such as the break out of Normandy, but then distribute them back to the divisions to maximize their use. The group organization worked well in World War II to allow commanders to readily redistribute artillery forces, but it disrupted unity of command because there were no habitual relationships between the nondivisonal battalions, the groups, and the corps.
86
In the period following World War II, artillery leaders searched for ways for maintain the flexibility of the group concept while minimizing disruption to command and control. One of the major discussions during this period was how to organize the nondivisional artillery units, there was little change to divisional artillery organization. The flexibility of the group concept in World War II competed with the ability to exercise adequate command and control because it disrupted the command relationships between the corps and division artillery commanders. 87 The Army identified this issue during World War II and the War Department attempted to fix it by issuing a document that promoted maintaining battalions habitually with a specific group, but it did little to 86 McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 ; Weathersby, "The Field Artillery Group in Support of the Corps and Field Army, 1942 Army, -1953 J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 2009), 312-313, 324. influence current Army practice. 88 Prior to the Korean War, artillery officers recommended creating an artillery division to organize nondivisional battalions that had their own organic artillery divided into groups and regiments that allowed the corps the flexibility to reallocate groups without losing continuity. 89 However, when the Army implemented the reforms, they assigned organic artillery battalions to the group, but only semi-permanently attached the group to corps. The corps could then attach the group to a division in a supporting role. Ultimately, the Army assigned nondivisional battalions permanently for continuity and decreased fluctuation, while retaining flexibility within the corps. The result was a combination of the fixed brigade and WWII group concepts. This did not always happen, but it was better in the Korean War than in World War II. This was the only change to the organization of nondivisional artillery; the group remained the primary organizational method of employing nondivisional artillery.
90
Aside from organizational changes, a key part of unity of command in the Korean War was the command responsibilities of the artillery commanders. Generally, in armies, corps, divisions and task forces the senior artilleryman was the commander of the organically assigned artillery units as well as the artillery officer on the special staff of the supported unit to advise the commander and staff on artillery matters and fire support coordination. Army, 1942 Army, -1953 89 "Sixty-seven of the eighty-two representatives at the artillery conference in March 1946 at Fort Sill agreed that an artillery division should replace the corps nondivisional artillery organization and recommended that corps artillery be organized with a HHB, an observation battalion, and a minimum number of organic battalions to be determined by future studies. They also recommended that all nondivisional artillery battalions be organized into permanent groups or regiments of mixed or similar caliber weapons." McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 ; The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, "Study of the Organization and Equipment of Field Artillery Units, Study Number 59." 1945, 47-48. 90 McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 91 U.S. Department of the Army, 10. commanders only had command authority over the battalions that were organic to their headquarters. With the new group concept, this meant that corps artillery commanders did not have direct command over the group artillery and the groups did not have direct command over the divisional artillery. 92 This did not alleviate the artillery commander's responsibility to synchronize the effects of artillery within their maneuver headquarters, regardless of the echelon.
One of the major developments during the interwar period to assist in this synchronization was the fire support coordination center. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook, 259; Wallace, Jr., "For Battlefield Teamwork: Fire Support Coordination Center," Combat Forces Journal, May 1953, 24-26; Carl W. Schaad, "Fire Support Coordination," Combat Forces Journal, Sep 1952, 39- October 1951 -July 1953 At the beginning of the Korean War, during the "Pusan Perimeter" defense, the only available artillery units were divisional artillery units. 96 Even as nondivisional artillery battalions entered the theater, they were attached as general support or reinforcing units for the divisions, only adding to the span of control for the division artillery commander. Artillerymen could only mass fires at the division level due to the absence of a corps artillery headquarters and the lack of nondivisional artillery battalions and often, due to the wide dispersion of units, this was difficult to accomplish. Each corps was authorized an artillery officer and small staff, but they had no command authority or capability to adequately synchronize fires across the corps. , 1942 McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 90-92 . 97 Weathersby, "The Field Artillery Group in Support of the Corps and Field Army, 1942 Army, -1953 ; U.S. Department of the Army, The Artillery School, "Report of the Artillery School Representative, AFF Observer Team No. 2, Concerning Korean Campaign, September to October 1950 , Inclusive," 27 November 1950 . 98 Weathersby, "The Field Artillery Group in Support of the Corps and Field Army, 1942 Army, -1953 99 Ibid., 130. 1951 and by March IX Corps Artillery arrived. 100 As more nondivisional battalions entered the theater, corps artillery commanders and their staffs could better reallocate and control how the attached units would support the overall corps fire plans. As the nature of the war transitioned to more of a static defense, artillery commanders placed even more emphasis on centrally coordinating and allocating nondivisional artillery to best disrupt the communist attacks.
101
Unity of command of artillery forces in Korea centered on the flexible organizational structure of the groups, the command authorities and responsibilities of the artillery commanders and the mission roles of the individual artillery battalions. Organizationally, the artillery group concept worked because it provided some continuity in command to the nondivisional artillery battalions while retaining the flexibility to move nondivisional units between corps and divisions.
The concept still required a corps artillery headquarters to nest the nondivisional and divisional fire plans within the maneuver fire planning. Synchronization of artillery forces across the theater of operations required fire support coordination centers at all levels to coordinate artillery and integrate air support across a wide front. These centers served as the medium for more effective command and control.
SECURITY
By September 1950, the North Koreans had confined the United Nations Forces to the Pusan Perimeter and were pressing to disrupt the defense along the Naktong River. artillery position in terms of the batteries responsibility to protect their position. "All units prepare their positions for defense against enemy ground attack with particular attention to antitank defense. Units must be prepared to counter airborne attacks, guerrilla action, and infiltration." Additionally, the manual advocated training artillery units in infantry tactics and delivery of artillery direct fire in support of the battery defense, though it was only specific to airborne operations. 110 In jungle warfare, FM 6-20 recommended mutually supporting battery defenses as well as co-location with the infantry reserve for additional defensive firepower. 111 Ultimately, the defense of the battery position was the responsibility of the artillerymen. Artillery commanders understood the need to develop mutually supporting battery positions and integrating them with maneuver, but the lack of training in this respect during the interwar period made this difficult to accomplish.
112
During the Korean War, North Korean and Chinese infiltration tactics exploited the weakness of artillery defenses and the breadth of the United Nation's defense. 113 "Infiltrating enemy units frequently occupied positions to the Americans' rear, striking command posts, support units or artillery positions." 114 The United Nations attempted to defend the entire defensive line and this resulted in the lack of defensive depth to counterattack. 115 In all, United Nation's forces lost over forty artillery pieces in this manner. 116 Later, the United Nations' built more depth into their defenses and integrated the artillery position defense with maneuver forces.
By the end of the conflict, the vulnerability of artillery formations was exposed and mitigation measures adapted. The Army learned two major lessons: Batteries must be able to defend themselves and the battalion must integrate a mutually supporting defense plan with maneuver.
General Almond expanded on these areas adding, "Automatic weapons within artillery units must be ready at all times to defend their positions whether on the move or in position. Destruction of artillery units is a primary enemy objective. All units must stress defense against infiltration tactics, train for anti-guerrilla measures and be prepared for all-around defense." 117 Despite accounting for these aspects in doctrine, the Army must train effectively in these principles to prevent reinventing the wheel.
CONCLUSION
The elements of mass, unity of effort and security characterized effective defensive operational artillery employment during the Korean War. Massing artillery fires was a complex process that was more than just providing overwhelming firepower. The ability to synchronize the effects of multiple divisional and nondivisonal artillery battalions within the corps, groups, and divisions required a command and control relationship structure that facilitated a coordinated artillery defense. Faced with an enemy that favored infiltration tactics and the overall nature of defensive operations across a wide non-linear front, the United Nations recognized the importance of adequately securing artillery positions. Today, applying these same characteristics to the Army's current ability to provide adequate fire support in major combat operations provides key insight into its preparation for future wars.
The concept of massed fires was not new to the Korean conflict. However, technological advances in the interwar period contributed to improved methods of target acquisition and communication between observers and the guns. The necessity to compensate for the lack of artillery units with concentrated fires honed the artillery system to prioritize prearrangement of targets in the defense. Target acquisition improvements allowed United Nations' forces to engage targets of opportunity more readily. Additionally, the need to reallocate and redistribute nondivisional artillery battalions required strategic and tactical mobility to respond to the Communist threat. Ultimately, the United Nation's advantage over North Korean and Chinese forces was their ability to mass fires on targets of opportunity.
Unity of command for artillery units during the Korean War reflected the desire to combine the flexibility of the group concept of World War II while providing continuity for nondivisional battalions within the groups. The corps centralized control during static defensive operations and decentralized control to the divisions during offensive maneuver. During the defensive, centralized control allowed commanders to better synchronize the effects of massed fires and allowed the corps flexibility to respond to the largest threats. These concepts will be essential to coordinating artillery units in the future especially without an artillery headquarters above the brigade level.
Security of artillery units in the beginning of the Korean War was woefully inadequate.
In the beginning of the conflict, artillerymen expected conflict to be similar to the linear battle during World War II. However, due to the enemy tactics of infiltration, they quickly realized that the artillery battalions had to defend themselves. Integrated battery defense plans nested within the maneuver defense improved throughout the conflict. Ultimately, by the end of the conflict, artillery battalions adjusted their methods to respond to security challenges.
Today, artillery doctrine still addresses each of the areas. The characterizations of mass are increased lethality, longer ranges, better target acquisition technology, and precision munitions. It could be said that advent of precision guiding munitions has somewhat changed the concept of massed fires by reducing the reliance on multiple artillery units to achieve desired effects. Regardless, the army's current artillery organization lacks the ability to integrate multiple battalions at the division level and higher. The absence of a division artillery headquarters and groups of nondivisional artillery battalions make integrating artillery fires across a broad front more difficult. Additionally, years of counterinsurgency operations and reliance on the security resident with forward operating bases has degraded the readiness of artillery battalions to provide their own security.
The fact that contemporary doctrine addresses the aspects of mass, unity of command and security does not mean that the artillery units can actually perform the concepts well. Much like during the start of the Korean War, the current U.S. Army's ability to execute all doctrinal artillery tasks such as massed fires is lacking. This is not necessarily for the same reasons as during the Korean War. Sound written doctrine does not necessarily mean that the army's artillery units can actually execute it. The last decade of counterinsurgency operations have certainly influenced the artillery's ability to mass fires above the battalion level. Today, someone could argue that the artillery is unprepared to mass fires against a near peer army in a high intensity conflict. The degradation in the artillery's ability to mass fires and secure itself is due to the last ten years of conflict and adequate training can fix it. The aspect of unity of command, however, is a completely different problem.
Effective unity of command for artillery units must be able to accomplish a number of functions. Commanders must be able to control subordinate artillery elements and the artillery must be organized to effectively integrate with maneuver and synchronize the concentration of artillery throughout the entire theater of operations. The major change in unity of command since the Korean War for divisional artillery is the elimination of the division artillery headquarters from the current army structure. In fact, there is no command headquarters for artillery units above the brigade level. The Army eliminated the division artillery and transferred the role of synchronizing divisional artillery fires to the Chief of Field Artillery in the division headquarters and above. However, the Chief of Field Artillery has no command authority over any artillery battalions.
In conclusion, the elements of artillery during the Korean contributed to the United Nation's success in the Korean War. Mass, unity of command and security each went through an evolution throughout the war and have continued to evolve through today. However, as the Army concludes operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is time to reevaluate each of these elements in terms of the next projected conflict. Artillerymen must ask themselves if they are prepared to execute these functions in a similar situation such as Korea. Has the artillery trained enough at massing fires above the battalion level? Is the Army's current unity of command adequate to synchronize the artillery of multiple divisions? And, do artillery battalions know how to adequately secure their formations in a high intensity conflict?
